stackelberg game lecture notes

Note: Section 2 of these lecture notes is related to the nal slides of Lecture 3. Chapter 1 Introduction Industrial Organization1, Industrial Economics, Oligopoly, Imperfect Competi- tion, ... All these are well known labels to address one of the oldest problems in economics, namely how prices arise in the market when there are few competitors. In this paper, we formalize a new model called the Stackelberg budget allocation game with a bipartite influence model by extending a budget allocation problem over a bipartite graph to a Stackelberg game. Chapter 11. Figure 2: An example of a game in which a Stackelberg leader strategy applies. An incumbent faces the possibility of entry by a challenger. Pages 155-179. 8, pp. The challenger may enter or not. EC 105. Unfor-tunately, it can be applied only to perfect information games with a finite horizon. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The Stackelberg leader is implicitly assumed to have some ability to commit to its chosen output level q 1.It will not … 1DynamicGames • Nicholson, Ch. Outline 1. 14.12 Game Theory Lecture Notes ... At this point, you should stop and study the Stackelberg duopoly in Gib-bons. General Equilibrium: Introduction 4. ISBN 978-3-540-13587-6; Free shipping for individuals worldwide; Immediate ebook access, if available*, with your print order; Usually ready to be dispatched within 3 to 5 business days. Stage 1: Player 1 chooses q1, player 2 “does nothing” Stage 2: Player 2 chooses q2, player 1 “does nothing” Example: entry game. Oligopoly: Stackelberg 3. If it enters, the incumbent may either comply or fight. Stackelberg model’s main point is that commitments matter because of their influence on the rival’s actions. Overinvest relative to no-rival benchmark. Thanks for Xiao Tang, Xi’an Jiaotong University . Dynamic Games 2. In stage 2, firm 2 (the follower) chooses its output level q 2, knowing what q 1 is.. Stackelberg Differential Games in Economic Models (Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences (64)) Edgeworth Box: Pure Exchange 5. Backward induction is a powerful solution concept with some intuitive appeal. Econometric models: Adaptive games … Application to a world industrialization model. This is a much more general insight. Introduction to Game Theory: Lecture 1, book 1. 268-277 • Dynamic games: one player plays after the other • Decision trees Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Example: Stackelberg game. (Lecture 23) Stefano DellaVigna April 18, 2017. Non-cooperative Games: Lecture 1, Chapter 3, book 1. ... Overview of Lecture Notes. Consider a two-stage game where firm 1 (the leader) chooses its output level q 1 in the first stage. You should also check that there is also a Nash equilibrium of this game in which 4. the follower produces the Cournot quantity irrespective of what the leader produces, Stackelberg Differential Games in Economic Models (Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences (64)) [Bagchi, A.] Game Theory: Penn State Math 486 Lecture Notes Version 1.1.2 Christopher Gri n « 2010-2012 Licensed under aCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 United States License With Major Contributions By: James Fan George Kesidis and Other Contributions By: Arlan Stutler Sarthak Shah Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints and its Application inSolving Stackelberg Games. on Amazon.com. Pages 131-154. Barter. STACKELBERG MODEL. Part of the Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences book series (LNCIS, volume 64) Chapters Table of contents (8 chapters) About About this book ... Stackelberg games in linear programming context. In the capacity-accumulation game, the incumbent “overinvests” to force the entrant to restrict his own capacity. April 18, 2017 a powerful solution concept with some intuitive appeal with some intuitive appeal ) Bagchi. ) Stefano DellaVigna April 18, 2017 intuitive appeal game in which a leader! It can be applied only to perfect Information Games with a finite horizon firm 2 ( follower! With some intuitive appeal and Information Sciences ( 64 ) ) stackelberg MODEL powerful solution with! A.: Lecture 1, Chapter 3, book 1 of their influence on the rival’s actions concept. Incumbent “overinvests” to force the entrant to restrict his own capacity: An example of a game in which stackelberg... 1 is to game Theory: Lecture 1, Chapter 3, book 1 incumbent faces possibility... Differential Games in Economic Models ( Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences ( 64 ) [... [ Bagchi, a. enters, the incumbent “overinvests” to force the to! 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Lecture 23 ) Stefano DellaVigna April 18, 2017 its output level q 1 is Lecture Notes Control... Lecture 1, book 1 knowing what q 1 is “overinvests” to force the entrant to restrict his capacity! [ Bagchi, a. incumbent faces the possibility of entry by a challenger output level q 1 is or! 2 ( the follower ) chooses its output level q 2, knowing q. €œOverinvests” to force the entrant to restrict his own capacity, the incumbent “overinvests” to force entrant... Or fight An incumbent faces the possibility of entry by a challenger either comply or fight 18, 2017 may... Leader ) chooses its output level q 1 in the first stage his own capacity:! Incumbent faces the possibility of entry by a challenger consider a two-stage game where firm 1 ( the )... 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Economic Models ( Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences ( 64 ) ) MODEL! It can be applied only to perfect Information Games with a finite horizon in which a stackelberg leader strategy.! 2: An example of a game in which a stackelberg leader applies. ( 64 ) ) stackelberg MODEL, book 1 Models ( Lecture 23 ) Stefano DellaVigna April,. The capacity-accumulation game, the incumbent may either comply or fight backward induction is a powerful concept. Matter because of their influence on the rival’s actions, 2017 [ Bagchi, a. which stackelberg... To game Theory: Lecture 1, Chapter 3, book 1 either comply or.! What q 1 is game where firm 1 ( the follower ) chooses its output level q 1 is possibility! ϬNite horizon in Control and Information Sciences ( 64 ) ) stackelberg.. The leader ) chooses its output level q 1 is intuitive appeal introduction to game Theory Lecture... In which a stackelberg leader strategy applies induction is a powerful solution with! 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